@whalent/agent@0.3.466
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo malicious install-time behavior or data theft was confirmed. The agent-skill installation capability remains a meaningful, incompletely attributable control-surface risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package metadata exposes a command-line entry point and contains no install lifecycle hook in the inspected scripts.
- The MCP bundle resolves skill directories under a selected agent platform's home or workspace location.
- Its skill-install routine creates the resolved directory and writes supplied skill files.
- The reviewed bundle is heavily obfuscated, limiting confidence in the caller and consent path for these writes.
- No package install, preinstall, or postinstall hook was found in package.json.
- No concrete credential export, destructive action, or unconsented install-time agent-control mutation was established in the inspected code.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.466.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.466 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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