@whalent/agent@0.3.480
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected code exposes requested agent configuration mutation, which falls under the warning policy rather than an install-time blocking rule. The core caller was inspected, but its citation could not be issued because the file exceeds the tool's 16 MiB verification limit.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Agent integration code resolves machine-scoped skills under the user's agent platform directory.
- Agent configuration helpers write MCP server commands, arguments and environment settings into .claude.json.
- dist/core.cjs routes an explicit tool operation to injectMcpServer and returns the registered server name; this exposes agent configuration mutation through a requested operation.
- package.json has no preinstall, install or postinstall hook and no runtime self-dependency.
- Inspected behavior supports a requested agent integration capability, without concrete evidence of covert installation, credential theft or malicious intent.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourceA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L4Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.480.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.480 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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