@whalent/agent@0.3.482
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection supports a warning for agent configuration mutation through runtime tools, without concrete malicious intent or an automatic install-time attack. The core handler and dispatch were inspected, although its size exceeded the citation tool's verification limit.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The skill tool downloads and installs a requested skill, defaulting to machine scope.
- Machine scope resolves beneath the user's agent platform directory, including .claude and .cursor.
- Downloaded skill files are written after a path containment check.
- The MCP registration tool can modify agent configuration, including config.toml.
- The core runtime dispatches MCP tool requests to a matching skill installation handler.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook and no runtime self-dependency.
- Skill installation requires an install action and a skill identifier; no covert installation was established.
- No concrete credential theft or malicious payload execution was established.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.482.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.482 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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