@whalent/agent@0.3.510
⚠ Under reviewStable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found a potentially consequential agent skill installation capability, but could not establish its reachability or consent boundary in the obfuscated bundle. The manifest shows no npm install-time hook, so the available evidence does not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has a prepublish-only build hook, with no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The MCP bundle defines a helper that downloads skill files using a bearer token and a service base passed to the helper.
- The bundle contains a helper that writes downloaded files into agent skill directories, including workspace and home-directory scopes.
- The entrypoint and MCP bundle are heavily obfuscated, and static inspection did not resolve the skill helpers’ callers or consent boundary.
- The installer checks file paths and skips paths that escape the selected skill directory.
- The manifest points the package entrypoint and command aliases to dist/index.cjs; the skill helpers are in dist/mcp.cjs.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.510.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.510 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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