@whalent/agent@0.3.515
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source confirms a runtime capability to install downloaded files into agent skill directories, while deliberate obfuscation prevents resolving its activation and consent boundaries. The manifest shows no install hook, so the evidence supports a warning rather than a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The CLI entrypoint and MCP bundle are deliberately obfuscated, limiting verification of their full runtime behavior.
- The MCP code can download skill files using a bearer token and write them into home, workspace, or managed agent skill directories.
- The CLI starts from user-supplied arguments; the manifest shows a prepublishOnly build hook, not an install hook.
- Skill writes are constrained to paths beneath the selected skill directory.
- The inspected manifest does not show a preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourceSource contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.515.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.515 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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