@whalent/agent@0.3.521
Stable wrapper for Whalent Agent core runtime
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no automatic install hook, and the observed agent integration routines are not enough to establish malicious behavior. Their consent boundary remains unclear, so warn about the agent extension lifecycle capability.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package exposes a CLI and marks `dist/index.cjs` as its main entrypoint.
- Its only publishing lifecycle hook runs a build command; the manifest has no install hook.
- The MCP bundle contains routines that install files into machine or workspace agent skill directories and fetch skill content using a bearer token.
- The bundle also contains a routine that writes MCP server entries to `.claude.json`.
- The daemon MCP entrypoint checks for a token before starting.
- The manifest does not configure automatic install-time activation of these routines.
- The inspected source does not establish whether skill or configuration changes require a separate confirmation.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourceA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L4Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.
dist/mcp.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whalent/agent@0.3.521.
See all versions of @whalent/agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whalent/agent@0.3.521 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.