@whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.5
Publicly installable CLI for Mandate — autonomous AI spend ledger, model governance layer, and real-time terminal agent
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe reachable postinstall flow makes unconsented changes to workspace and global AI-agent control settings. This meets the policy for blocking install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The package's postinstall hook runs during installation.
Impact
The installed package is registered for execution by those agent environments without an explicit setup action by the user.
Mechanism
The setup command writes a server entry into Antigravity workspace settings and Claude's global settings, then starts a local proxy.
Policy narrative
During installation, the postinstall hook invokes the CLI's setup command. The command writes a Mandate MCP server entry into the workspace's Antigravity configuration and the user's global Claude configuration without an affirmative consent check in that flow, and starts a local telemetry proxy.
AI rationale
The reachable postinstall flow makes unconsented changes to workspace and global AI-agent control settings. This meets the policy for blocking install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsdist/commands/setup.js.agents/mcp_config.json.claude.json
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 98.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- The postinstall hook runs the package CLI with the setup command, which dispatches to the setup routine.
- That routine writes a Mandate MCP server entry into the current workspace's Antigravity settings and the user's global Claude settings without an affirmative consent check in the install path.
- The setup routine also starts a local telemetry proxy as part of the same automatic install flow.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/mandate.js setup
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg19"postinstall": "node ./bin/mandate.js setup",
"build": "tsc",
"dev": "tsx src/index.ts",
"start": "node ./bin/mandate.js",
"test": "vitest run",
"lint": "tsc --
High
Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
The postinstall hook runs the package CLI with the setup command, which dispatches to the setup routine.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L19•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/mandate.js setup
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/commands/mcp.jsView file
Findings
1 Critical3 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackdist/commands/mcp.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/monitor/detector.js
HighSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.5.
See all versions of @whoiskaushik/mandate for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.5. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.