registry / @whoiskaushik/mandate / 0.1.6

@whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.6

AI Security Review

scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection confirms automatic agent configuration changes and a detached proxy launched by postinstall. The inspected behavior is first-party package-owned setup, so it warrants a warning rather than a block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The package’s postinstall hook runs during installation.

Impact

Claude Code and Antigravity may load the package’s MCP server without a separate setup command, and the local proxy remains running after installation finishes.

Mechanism

The setup routine writes MCP configuration entries and launches a detached telemetry proxy.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/commands/setup.jsdist/monitor/ports.jsdist/mcp/server.js~/.claude.json$cwd/.agents/mcp_config.json

Network endpoints1

127.0.0.1:8000

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The postinstall hook automatically runs the setup command.
Setup writes the package’s MCP entry to the project’s Antigravity config and the user’s global Claude config without a consent check.
Setup starts a detached local telemetry proxy.
The registered MCP server exposes Mandate governance tools; inspected source does not show it collecting prompts or credentials.

Evidence against

The MCP server is package-owned and its listed tools concern Mandate status, model switches, and action checks.
The proxy is started on a loopback address; inspected setup code does not send installation data to an external collector.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 20 file(s), 111 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.openai.com, mandate-cockpit.vercel.app

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/mandate.js setup

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/mandate.js setup

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

19"postinstall": "node ./bin/mandate.js setup", "build": "tsc", "dev": "tsx src/index.ts", "start": "node ./bin/mandate.js", "test": "vi

Medium

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

The postinstall hook automatically runs the setup command.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L19

dist/commands/mcp.jsView file

8Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L8: export async function installMcpServer(options = {}) { L9: const isClaude = options.claude || (!options.claude && !options.antigravity); L10: const isAntigravity = options.antigravity || (!options.claude && !options.antigravity); L11: const binPath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), "node_modules/.bin/mandate"); ... L13: try { L14: const agentsDir = path.resolve(process.cwd(), ".agents"); L15: if (!fs.existsSync(agentsDir)) { L16: fs.mkdirSync(agentsDir, { recursive: true }); L17: } L18: const configPath = path.join(agentsDir, "mcp_config.json"); L19: let currentConfig = { mcpServers: {} }; L20: if (fs.existsSync(configPath)) { Write operation from dist/config.js: L58: if (!fs.existsSync(targetDir)) { L59: fs.mkdirSync(t

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

dist/commands/mcp.jsView on unpkg · L8

dist/monitor/detector.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.4 matchedIdentity = npm:QHdob2lza2F1c2hpay9tYW5kYXRl:0.1.4 similarity = 0.778 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

High

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/monitor/detector.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/mandate.js setup

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node ./bin/mandate.js setup

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

19"postinstall": "node ./bin/mandate.js setup", "build": "tsc", "dev": "tsx src/index.ts", "start": "node ./bin/mandate.js", "test": "vi

Medium

Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence

The postinstall hook automatically runs the setup command.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L19

dist/commands/mcp.jsView file

Findings

1 Critical2 High5 Medium4 Low

CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackdist/commands/mcp.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/monitor/detector.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.6.

See all versions of @whoiskaushik/mandate for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-21 20:08:43.628Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.