@whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.7
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic install-time agent configuration and proxy startup create an agent extension lifecycle risk. The registered server belongs to this package, and the inspected source does not establish concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook automatically runs the package setup command.
- Setup registers this package’s MCP server in the workspace agent configuration.
- Setup registers this package’s MCP server in the user’s Claude configuration.
- Setup starts a background proxy, which is launched as a detached process.
- The command wrapper sends session metadata to a loopback proxy.
- The MCP server exposes Mandate status and model governance tools.
- The reviewed setup registers this package’s own MCP server; the inspected paths do not establish a separate payload or credential export.
- The session notification goes to the local proxy and contains command and status metadata.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.7.
See all versions of @whoiskaushik/mandate for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @whoiskaushik/mandate@0.1.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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