registry / @wirecat/max-cli / 0.88.0
@wirecat/max-cli@0.88.0
MAX Messenger bots through the official Bot API, and a personal MAX account, from the terminal — built for agents and scripts
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe lifecycle code is restricted to global setup, and agent-skill installation is gated by an explicit environment setting. The credential references use standard provider endpoints, and the flagged Unicode regex removes control characters during filename sanitization.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The postinstall setup runs only for global installs; skill writes require MAX_INSTALL_AGENT to be set. Provider-key use occurs when the relevant analysis or embedding operation is requested.
Impact
No malicious impact identified in the reviewed paths.
Mechanism
The reviewed code reads a key for the selected provider and uses its standard endpoint by default. No malicious credential redirection or remote payload execution was established.
AI rationale
The lifecycle code is restricted to global setup, and agent-skill installation is gated by an explicit environment setting. The credential references use standard provider endpoints, and the flagged Unicode regex removes control characters during filename sanitization.
Network endpoints2
api.anthropic.comapi.openai.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The postinstall hook delegates to setup that returns immediately unless this is a global install.
- Global install writes an agent skill only when MAX_INSTALL_AGENT is explicitly set to a supported target.
- The flagged credential flow selects the configured provider’s key and defaults to the official Anthropic or OpenAI endpoint.
Evidence against
- The CLI imports its packaged bundle and local chunks; the reviewed loader shows no remote code fetch or execution.
- The flagged invisible Unicode characters are in a filename-sanitization regex that strips control and bidi characters.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsPossibleObfuscationUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
17 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.mjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/online.jsView file
1import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { createInterface } from "node:readline";
High
Findings
4 Critical9 High7 Medium6 Low
CriticalRemote Asset Decode Executedist/bundle/program-DWICXYNR.js
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodedist/bundle/chunk-ROO734A5.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/bundle/program-DWICXYNR.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/bundle/chunk-IFUFCNCB.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/online.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/bundle/program-DWICXYNR.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/bundle/program-DWICXYNR.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/bundle/program-DWICXYNR.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/bundle/chunk-DW4DU2V5.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wirecat/max-cli@0.88.0.
See all versions of @wirecat/max-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wirecat/max-cli@0.88.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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