@withfudge/design@2.0.7
Installer and agent guidance for the hosted Fudge design-corpus MCP server.
AI Security Review
scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install lifecycle hook or confirmed attack behavior. The flagged process and network calls belong to user-invoked CLI features and are scoped to browser login, Keychain access, and Fudge workspace setup.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and has no install lifecycle hook; its scripts are build, prepack, test, and typecheck.
- Login is an explicit CLI action; it exchanges a temporary login code with the configured API, whose default is api.withfudge.com, then stores the returned session.
- The flagged child-process calls support browser launch and macOS Keychain operations; source shows no shell command used to harvest or transfer credentials.
- Workspace connection is explicitly invoked and sends the saved session to the configured Fudge API; it writes the registry token to the user npm config and only the @fudge registry setting to the project config.
- The install and network signals resolve to CLI features invoked by the user, with no confirmed attack behavior or automatic install-time action.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedA single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/ops/login.jsView on unpkg · L107Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @withfudge/design@2.0.7.
See all versions of @withfudge/design for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @withfudge/design@2.0.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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