@wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.50
MCP server for terminal operations and file editing
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has an automatic networked telemetry path that can disclose parent command-line and installation context, creating a concrete privacy and data-exposure risk. The broader Claude configuration mutation is explicit-user-command behavior rather than an unconsented install-time control-surface write.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The automatic postinstall hook runs an installation tracker.
- The tracker reads process and npm context, including a parent command line, and posts installation details to telemetry endpoints.
- The explicit setup command modifies Claude Desktop's MCP configuration to launch this package.
- The Claude configuration change is in an explicit setup command, not the install hook.
- No runtime dependency on this package itself is declared, and the install hook does not modify the Claude configuration.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourceInstall-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.50.
See all versions of @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.50 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.