registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander / 0.2.52

@wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.52

MCP server for terminal operations and file editing

AI Security Review

scanned 23d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source confirms explicit-user-command mutation of an AI-agent configuration, which the supplied policy classifies as warning-only capability risk. No block-eligible malicious behavior was established.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The user invokes the setup command or executes the setup script directly.

Impact

Claude gains access to Desktop Commander's terminal and file operation capabilities.

Mechanism

Setup assigns the desktop-commander MCP server entry and saves the updated Claude configuration.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/setup-claude-server.jsdist/index.jsdist/npm-scripts/setup.jsclaude_desktop_config.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with high false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The explicit setup command adds Desktop Commander to Claude's MCP configuration and writes the configuration file.
Setup is activated by the setup CLI argument or direct execution of the setup script.
Postinstall runs installation telemetry and ripgrep verification, rather than Claude configuration setup.
Installation telemetry includes platform and installation context.
The remote integration forwards requested tools and arguments to the local MCP client.

Evidence against

No concrete malicious installation chain or credential theft was established.
Runtime dependencies do not include the package itself.
The inspected ripgrep resolver locates an existing binary and adjusts its executable permissions.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStrings

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 9-49json

9 "repository": {

10 "type": "git",

11 "url": "https://github.com/wonderwhy-er/DesktopCommanderMCP.git"

12 },

13 "bugs": "https://github.com/wonderwhy-er/DesktopCommanderMCP/issues",

14 "type": "module",

15 "engines": {

16 "node": ">=18.0.0"

17 },

18 "bin": {

19 "desktop-commander": "dist/index.js",

20 "setup": "dist/setup-claude-server.js",

21 "remove": "dist/uninstall-claude-server.js"

22 },

23 "files": [

24 "dist",

25 "logo.png",

26 "testemonials"

27 ],

28 "scripts": {

29 "postinstall": "node dist/track-installation.js && node dist/npm-scripts/verify-ripgrep.js || node -e \"process.exit(0)\"",

Critical

Red Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L29

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L29

30 "open-chat": "open -n /Applications/Claude.app",

31 "device:install": "cd src/remote-device && npm install",

32 "device:start": "tsx src/remote-device/device.ts",

33 "device:start:dev": "nodemon --watch src/remote-device --exec tsx src/remote-device/device.ts",

34 "sync-version": "node scripts/sync-version.js",

35 "bump": "node scripts/sync-version.js --bump",

36 "bump:minor": "node scripts/sync-version.js --bump --minor",

37 "bump:major": "node scripts/sync-version.js --bump --major",

38 "build": "tsc && shx cp setup-claude-server.js uninstall-claude-server.js track-installation.js dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/*.js && shx mkdir -p dist/data && shx cp src/data/onboarding-prompts.json dist/data/ && shx mkdir -p dist/remote-device/scripts && shx cp src/remote-device/scripts/blocking-offline-update.js dist/remote-device/scripts/ && node scripts/build-ui-runtime.cjs",

39 "watch": "tsc --watch",

40 "start": "node dist/index.js",

41 "start:debug": "node --inspect-brk=9229 dist/index.js",

42 "setup": "npm install --include=dev && npm run build && node setup-claude-server.js",

43 "setup:debug": "npm install && npm run build && node setup-claude-server.js --debug",

44 "remove": "npm install && npm run build && node uninstall-claude-server.js",

45 "prepare": "npm run build",

46 "clean": "shx rm -rf dist",

47 "test": "npm run build && node test/run-all-tests.js",

48 "test:integration": "npm run build && node test/integration/run-all-integration-tests.js",

49 "test:debug": "node --inspect test/run-all-tests.js",

dist/ui/config-editor/config-editor-runtime.jsView file

Lines 5-45javascript

5 if (input[${$}] === undefined) {

6 if (${$} in input) {

7 newResult[${$}] = undefined;

8 }

9 } else {

dist/tools/pdf/manipulations.jsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1import fs from 'fs/promises';

2import { createRequire } from 'module';

3import { normalizePageIndexes } from './utils.js';

4import { parseMarkdownToPdf } from './markdown.js'

dist/track-installation.jsView file

Lines 1-34javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

3/**

4 * Installation Source Tracking Script

5 * Runs during npm install to detect how Desktop Commander was installed

6 *

7 * Debug logging can be enabled with:

8 * - DEBUG=desktop-commander npm install

9 * - DEBUG=* npm install

10 * - NODE_ENV=development npm install

11 * - DC_DEBUG=true npm install

dist/setup-claude-server.jsView file

•Runtime or CLI code links a write operation to an explicit external AI-agent control path: import { homedir, platform } from 'os'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import path from 'path'; import { join } from 'path'; import { readfilesync, writefilesync, existssync, appendfilesync, mkdirsync } from 'fs'; import { fileurltopath } from 'url'; import { dirname } from 'path'; import { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { version as nodeversion } from 'process'; import * as https from 'https'; import { randomuuid } from 'crypto'; const telemetry_proxy_url = 'https://telemetry.desktopcommander.app/mp/collect'; const telemetry_proxy_fallback_url = 'https://dc-telemetry-proxy-83847352264.europe-west1.run.app/mp/collect';

High

External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Runtime or CLI source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/setup-claude-server.jsView on unpkg

dist/remote-device/desktop-commander-integration.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 5

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/remote-device/desktop-commander-integration.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/remote-device/desktop-commander-integration.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.51 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.2.51 similarity = 0.957 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/remote-device/desktop-commander-integration.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node dist/track-installation.js && node dist/npm-scripts/verify-ripgrep.js || node -e "process.exit(0)"

Critical

Red Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node dist/track-installation.js && node dist/npm-scripts/verify-ripgrep.js || node -e "process.exit(0)"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/ui/config-editor/config-editor-runtime.jsView file

25path: iss.path ? [${Ge(I)}, ...iss.path] : [${Ge(I)}] L26: })));`),p.write(`newResult[${Ge(I)}] = ${b}.value`)}p.write("payload.value = newResult;"),p.write("return payload;");let Z=p.compile();return(I,b)=>Z(m,I,b)},r,o=at,a=!Tr.jitless,u... L27: `)}var ir=e=>(t,n,i,r)=>{let o=i?Object.assign(i,{async:!1}):{async:!1},a=t._zod.run({value:n,issues:[]},o);if(a instanceof Promise)throw new Re;if(a.issues.length){let s=new(r?.Er...

Findings

2 Critical4 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalRed Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/remote-device/desktop-commander-integration.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/track-installation.js

HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/setup-claude-server.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/remote-device/desktop-commander-integration.js#virtual:normalized:round1

MediumDynamic Requiredist/tools/pdf/manipulations.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.52.

See all versions of @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @wonderwhy-er/desktop-commander@0.2.52 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-30 02:34:13.899Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code