@wraps.dev/cli@3.17.0
Deploy email, SMS, and CDN infrastructure to your AWS account with one command. Sets up SES with DKIM/SPF/DMARC, event processing, and history automatically.
AI Security Review
scanned 29d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource establishes explicit user-command agent configuration mutation, which warrants a warning under the supplied policy. The inspected behavior does not establish malicious intent or a block-eligible attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Running wraps email templates init or wraps email workflows init without disabling Claude scaffolding.
Impact
Changes influence subsequent agent behavior and can replace existing Wraps skill content. No background automatic update mechanism was identified in these callers.
Mechanism
The CLI creates or updates marked instruction sections and writes Wraps skill files under the project's .claude directory.
AI rationale
Source establishes explicit user-command agent configuration mutation, which warrants a warning under the supplied policy. The inspected behavior does not establish malicious intent or a block-eligible attack.
Evidence
dist/cli.js.claude/CLAUDE.md.claude/skills/wraps-templates/SKILL.md.claude/skills/wraps-workflows/SKILL.md
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- Template initialization writes Claude context by default unless noClaude is set.
- The scaffold helper writes project-local Claude skill files, replacing existing content at those paths.
- Workflow initialization also writes Claude context and a Wraps workflow skill.
- The active CLI dispatch invokes this setup through explicit initialization commands.
- The manifest has no automatic npm installation lifecycle hooks.
Evidence against
- Inspected telemetry sends event metadata and an organization identifier, not the stored authentication token.
- The inspected inbound processor stores parsed email in AWS S3 and publishes AWS EventBridge events.
- No concrete covert exfiltration or malicious installation behavior was established.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
15 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
19import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
L20: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname;
L21: var init_esm_shims = __esm({
...
L31: function isCI() {
L32: if (process.env.CI === "true" || process.env.CI === "1") {
L33: return true;
...
L316: // src/utils/shared/aws-detection.ts
L317: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L318: import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
...
L382: const sts = new STSClient({ region: "us-east-1" });
L383: const identity = await sts.send(new GetCallerIdentityCommand({}));
L384: return identity.Account || null;
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1919Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.js
L19: import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
L20: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname;
L21: var init_esm_shims = __esm({
...
L31: function isCI() {
L32: if (process.env.CI === "true" || process.env.CI === "1") {
L33: return true;
...
L316: // src/utils/shared/aws-detection.ts
L317: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L318: import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
...
L382: const sts = new STSClient({ region: "us-east-1" });
L383: const identity = await sts.send(new GetCallerIdentityCommand({}));
L384: return identity.Account || null;
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/cli.jsFindings
3 Critical8 High5 Medium8 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShelldist/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/cli.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/lambda/inbound-processor/index.js
MediumDynamic Require
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wraps.dev/cli@3.17.0.
See all versions of @wraps.dev/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wraps.dev/cli@3.17.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.