@wraps.dev/cli@3.17.3
Deploy email, SMS, and CDN infrastructure to your AWS account with one command. Sets up SES with DKIM/SPF/DMARC, event processing, and history automatically.
AI Security Review
scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI supports an unrestricted API URL override and sends its resolved credential to that target, creating a concrete conditional credential exposure risk. The default is the Wraps API and no fixed unrelated recipient was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Running an authenticated CLI operation with WRAPS_API_URL set to a destination chosen by the operator.
Impact
If the configured destination is untrusted, it can receive the token and potentially use its associated access.
Mechanism
The CLI selects the configured API base and places the resolved token in a Bearer authorization header for requests to that base.
AI rationale
The CLI supports an unrestricted API URL override and sends its resolved credential to that target, creating a concrete conditional credential exposure risk. The default is the Wraps API and no fixed unrelated recipient was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Evidence
dist/cli.js
Network endpoints1
api.wraps.dev
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 88.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI accepts WRAPS_API_URL as an API base override and uses it to resolve the API target alongside a saved or supplied token.
- The API client sends that token as a Bearer credential to the resolved API base; the override is not restricted to the default Wraps host.
- The agent context helper writes a marked section to .claude/CLAUDE.md when invoked by CLI setup commands.
- package.json has no install lifecycle hook; its listed scripts are development and build commands.
Evidence against
- The default API endpoint is https://api.wraps.dev, and no fixed unrelated credential recipient was found in the inspected code.
- The inspected agent-context write is part of an explicit CLI setup flow, not an npm install hook.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
14 flaggeddist/cli.jsView file
19import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
L20: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname;
L21: var init_esm_shims = __esm({
...
L31: function isCI() {
L32: if (process.env.CI === "true" || process.env.CI === "1") {
L33: return true;
...
L316: // src/utils/shared/aws-detection.ts
L317: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L318: import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
...
L382: const sts = new STSClient({ region: "us-east-1" });
L383: const identity = await sts.send(new GetCallerIdentityCommand({}));
L384: return identity.Account || null;
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1919Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.js
L19: import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
L20: var getFilename, getDirname, __dirname;
L21: var init_esm_shims = __esm({
...
L31: function isCI() {
L32: if (process.env.CI === "true" || process.env.CI === "1") {
L33: return true;
...
L316: // src/utils/shared/aws-detection.ts
L317: import { execSync } from "child_process";
L318: import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from "fs";
...
L382: const sts = new STSClient({ region: "us-east-1" });
L383: const identity = await sts.send(new GetCallerIdentityCommand({}));
L384: return identity.Account || null;
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/cli.jsFindings
2 Critical8 High5 Medium8 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighChild Processdist/cli.js
HighShelldist/cli.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/cli.js
HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/cli.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/lambda/inbound-processor/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/lambda/agent-enforcer/index.js
MediumNetwork
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @wraps.dev/cli@3.17.3.
See all versions of @wraps.dev/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @wraps.dev/cli@3.17.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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