---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@xz-bails/baileys"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@xz-bails/baileys/v/6.0.10.md"
package: "@xz-bails/baileys"
report_status: "published"
title: "@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "6.0.10"
---

# @xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow a publisher-selected newsletter without a request to do so.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 6.0.10
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The default socket startup path performs an unsolicited follow on the user's WhatsApp account for a hard-coded newsletter. The Node-version preinstall check is benign, but it does not affect this reachable account action.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-17T11:20:39.867Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-17T11:21:26.824Z
- **Download time:** 776 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1506 ms
- **AI review time:** 44674 ms
- **Total time:** 46957 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The default socket startup path follows a hard-coded WhatsApp newsletter using the user's account.

- **Trigger:** A consumer calls the exported makeWASocket and the WhatsApp connection opens; the default can be disabled with autoFollowNewsletters: false.

- **Impact:** The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow a publisher-selected newsletter without a request to do so.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/index.js, lib/Socket/communities.js, lib/Socket/newsletter.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-17T11:21:26.824Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The newsletter socket schedules a FOLLOW query for 120363430764800148@newsletter over the authenticated WhatsApp socket.

- **Attack narrative:** When an application creates the exported socket and connects to WhatsApp, the composed newsletter layer schedules a FOLLOW operation for the hard-coded newsletter 120363430764800148@newsletter. It performs the action through the user's authenticated WhatsApp socket by default; callers must explicitly set autoFollowNewsletters to false to prevent it.

- **Rationale:** The default socket startup path performs an unsolicited follow on the user's WhatsApp account for a hard-coded newsletter. The Node-version preinstall check is benign, but it does not affect this reachable account action.

- **Network endpoints:** wss://web.whatsapp.com/ws/chat

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 99.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The exported socket constructor calls the communities socket layer, which composes the newsletter socket layer., The newsletter layer defaults its auto-follow target to the hard-coded JID 120363430764800148@newsletter; callers can change the target or disable auto-follow., After the WhatsApp connection opens, the code sends a FOLLOW query for that target through the authenticated socket., The preinstall hook only checks the Node.js version and exits on versions below 20.

- **Evidence against:** The package is described as a Baileys-based WhatsApp library, so authenticated WhatsApp network access is part of its purpose., Callers can disable the behavior with autoFollowNewsletters: false, but it is enabled by default.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10.

- Avoid installing @xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 4. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L107: pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 8. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 9. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 692
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 10. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 95.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 11. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 12. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/business.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/lib/Utils/business.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3
```

### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @poucode/baileys@2.0.4
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHBvdWNvZGUvYmFpbGV5cw:2.0.4
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 14. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@xz-bails/baileys@6.0.10/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall
- **Dependencies:** 14
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 31
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 18

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal github:tenka-san/libsignal-node (Dependency)
- long ^5.3.2 (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @xz-bails/baileys
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 6.0.10
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-11-17T06:16:11.204Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-17T11:21:26.824Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-19T23:31:21.175Z
- **Known versions:** 2
- **Latest version:** 6.0.11
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** A Baileys-based WhatsApp Web library maintained by xz-bails.
- **Author:** Rz
- **Keywords:** xz-bails, baileys, whatsapp, whatsapp-api, whatsapp-web, wa-bot, whatsapp bot
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 120
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,938,480 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@xz-bails/baileys/v/6.0.10>)
- [Homepage](<https://t.me/XzRzSynxC>)
