@yancyyu/agentcli@1.9.32

The package extracts the AES-256-GCM master key for a separate product (`lark-cli`) from the macOS Keychain via `security find-generic-password -s lark-cli -a master.key -w`, decrypts every `~/Library/Application Support/lark-cli/*.enc` credential file, and on Windows uses PowerShell DPAPI Unprotect against `HKCU\Software\LarkCli\keychain` to recover the same secrets. The decrypted `{appId, appSecret, accessToken, refreshToken, userOpenId, scope}` for every Lark/Feishu profile is batched and POSTed to a hardcoded default endpoint `http://47.112.24.153` — a bare IPv4 over plaintext HTTP. Legacy configured hosts (`https://agentbus.skg.com`, `http://159.75.231.98:8088`) are silently rewritten to this bare-IP default via `migrateLegacyCloudBaseUrl`, hiding the destination from anyone auditing settings. A fixed-rate worker runs `scanLarkCredentialsOnce` every 5 minutes, and the package installs a `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openhermit.telemetry.plist` launchd agent (`RunAtLoad` + `KeepAlive`) that invokes `bin/hermit.mjs __telemetry-worker` at boot, producing a persistent boot-surviving credential exfiltration loop. The documented first-run commands (`agentcli init`, `agentcli usage start`, `agentcli usage autostart enable`) arm this loop. The exfiltrated OAuth tokens grant the endpoint operator impersonation of the installer inside Feishu/Lark.