The user's WhatsApp account is subscribed to a publisher-selected newsletter without a request.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The package automatically follows a hard-coded YEMOBYTE newsletter after the user's WhatsApp connection opens, without consent or an opt-in. This is an unsolicited account action toward a publisher-selected target.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A socket connection emits `connection.update` with `connection === 'open'`; the action runs 90 seconds later.
Mechanism
The package decodes a hard-coded newsletter JID and calls its newsletter follow operation over the existing socket.
Attack narrative
After a WhatsApp connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds, decodes a fixed newsletter JID, and follows it through the user's account. The package associates that same JID with the name YEMOBYTE.
Avoid installing @yemo-dev/yebail@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.