The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow a target selected by the package publisher.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The package automatically follows a hard-coded WhatsApp newsletter on connection, using the user's account without consent. This is an unrequested account action toward a publisher-chosen target.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A WhatsApp connection opens; the action runs 90 seconds later.
Mechanism
The package decodes a hard-coded newsletter ID and calls the socket's newsletter follow operation without a user request.
Attack narrative
When the WhatsApp connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds, reconstructs the hard-coded target `120363408975923153@newsletter` from character codes, and follows it through the user's authenticated socket. This performs an account action toward a publisher-selected target without the user's request; errors are silently ignored.
Avoid installing @yemo-dev/yebail@1.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.