Users are enrolled in publisher-selected newsletters without requesting those follows.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The package automatically follows two hard-coded WhatsApp newsletters after a connection opens, using the user's account without a request. This is a concrete unauthorized account action.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A WhatsApp connection opens; the action runs after a 90-second delay.
Mechanism
The connection callback constructs two newsletter IDs from character codes and calls newsletterFollow for each.
Attack narrative
When a WhatsApp connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds, constructs two fixed newsletter IDs from encoded digits, and follows both through the user's connected account. The follow method sends a WhatsApp FOLLOW mutation. This performs account actions toward targets selected by the package author without a user request.
Avoid installing @yemo-dev/yebail@1.1.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.