The user's account is made to follow newsletters without an explicit request.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The package automatically follows two hard-coded WhatsApp newsletters after a connection opens, using the user's account without a request. This is a concrete, unrelated account action and warrants blocking publication.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A WhatsApp connection opens; the action runs after a 90-second delay.
Mechanism
The code decodes two hard-coded newsletter identifiers and calls newsletterFollow for each, which issues the FOLLOW operation.
Attack narrative
After a WhatsApp connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds, decodes two hard-coded newsletter identifiers, and follows both using the connected account. The follow method sends the service's FOLLOW operation. These account actions target channels chosen by the package publisher and happen without an explicit user request.
Avoid installing @yemo-dev/yebail@3.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.