The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow targets chosen by the package publisher.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The socket automatically follows two hard-coded newsletters after connecting, using the user's authenticated WhatsApp account without a request. This is an unauthorized account action and warrants blocking publication.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A WhatsApp connection opens; the action runs 90 seconds later without a user request.
Mechanism
The package decodes two hard-coded newsletter IDs and calls newsletterFollow for each. That method sends a FOLLOW query.
Attack narrative
After a WhatsApp connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds, decodes two hard-coded newsletter IDs, and follows both through the authenticated socket. The action is automatic and unrelated to an explicit user request, so it uses the connected account to change its subscriptions toward targets chosen by the publisher.
Avoid installing @yemo-dev/yebail@4.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.