The user's WhatsApp account is made to follow a target selected by the package publisher without a request from the user.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The receive socket automatically follows a hard-coded newsletter after each successful connection, using the user's account without a request. This is a publisher-chosen account action and warrants blocking.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A socket connection opens; the action is scheduled 90 seconds later.
Mechanism
The package constructs a fixed newsletter JID and calls newsletterFollow, which sends a FOLLOW action.
Attack narrative
When a socket connection opens, the package waits 90 seconds, builds a fixed newsletter JID from character codes, and follows it through the user's WhatsApp account. This account action is automatic and targets a newsletter selected by the package publisher.
Avoid installing @yemo-dev/yebail@4.1.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.