@yhong91/vibetime@0.1.31
vibetime CLI — install AI-agent hooks (Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Pi) and report activity to vibetime.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not malicious under the install-control-surface policy because all agent integration writes are user-command initiated. It warrants a warning because it installs persistent agent hooks and exports activity metadata to a non-TLS default endpoint.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- bin/vibetime.mjs: explicit `vibetime install` writes/merges hooks for Codex, Claude, OpenCode, and Pi.
- bin/vibetime.mjs: installed hooks invoke `vibetime hook`, which spawns a throttled background local importer.
- bin/vibetime.mjs: rollups are POSTed to the default HTTP endpoint 121.196.224.82:3001.
- bin/vibetime.mjs: backfill reads local AI-agent session/history files.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
- Hook/config changes require the explicit `vibetime install` command; normal install/import does not mutate agent settings.
- Generated-file writes refuse non-vibetime content unless the user passes `--force`.
- Source states imports are metadata-only and excludes prompt text, command text, source code, and diffs.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
bin/vibetime.mjsView on unpkg · L11174Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @yhong91/vibetime@0.1.31.
See all versions of @yhong91/vibetime for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @yhong91/vibetime@0.1.31 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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