@yuandc/aica@0.1.59
AICA remote Agent worker
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged persistence and platform checks resolve to worker-owned interactive shell setup and path normalization. Inspected source supports user-invoked remote-worker functionality without concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has explicit CLI commands and no automatic installation lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- dist/core/aca-config.js uses platform checks to normalize project paths, not evade inspection.
- dist/core/terminal/shell.js writes a worker-owned Bash configuration and selects it with an interactive shell argument.
- dist/core/terminal/service.js launches a local terminal using the selected shell and terminal configuration.
- Remote terminal access follows the explicit start command and requires a configured server URL and worker token.
- The Codex subprocess receives the managed provider's supplied API key, rather than a harvested service credential.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @yuandc/aica@0.1.59.
See all versions of @yuandc/aica for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @yuandc/aica@0.1.59 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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