@yuandc/aica@0.1.66
AICA remote Agent worker
AI Security Review
scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install hook, and the flagged file creation is confined to an interactive Bash rcfile under the AICA home directory. The inspected configuration and terminal behavior align with the package’s explicit remote-worker CLI, so the scanner’s persistence and fingerprint-gating hints do not establish malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and only start/help scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI registers explicit worker commands and identifies itself as a remote agent worker.
- The shell helper creates a private Bash rcfile under the AICA home directory and passes it to an interactive shell.
- The terminal service starts the selected shell in the requested working directory when opening a terminal.
- The server URL comes from configuration or the environment, with the ACA service as its default.
Source & flagged code
3 flaggedA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @yuandc/aica@0.1.66.
See all versions of @yuandc/aica for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @yuandc/aica@0.1.66 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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