@yuandc/aica@0.1.74
AICA remote Agent worker
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install hook, and the flagged shell behavior is limited to a generated rcfile used by an interactive terminal. The reviewed login path sends credentials to the configured ACA server’s login endpoint; the inspected sources show no separate attack behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI and defines only start and help scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI dispatches commands when invoked, and worker login sends supplied credentials to the selected ACA server’s login endpoint.
- The default server is the package’s ACA service; configuration stores worker identity and project settings.
- The flagged shell helper writes a generated rcfile under the application home and passes it to an interactive bash process.
- The terminal service calls the helper when opening a terminal and spawns the requested shell.
Source & flagged code
3 flaggedA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @yuandc/aica@0.1.74.
See all versions of @yuandc/aica for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @yuandc/aica@0.1.74 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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