@yuandc/aica@0.1.75
AICA remote Agent worker
AI Security Review
scanned 13d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install hook, and the flagged shell file is used as an rc file for an interactive terminal session. Login credentials go to the configured AICA service, so the inspected source establishes no concrete attack surface.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest points both CLI names to the worker entrypoint and defines only start and help scripts, with no install lifecycle hook.
- The worker entrypoint registers commands when the CLI is invoked.
- The default server is the AICA service; login submits the entered credentials to its authentication endpoint, and the client sends requests to the configured server.
- The terminal helper creates a package-owned Bash rc file and passes it to an interactive Bash session; terminal creation invokes the helper before spawning the selected shell.
Source & flagged code
3 flaggedA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @yuandc/aica@0.1.75.
See all versions of @yuandc/aica for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @yuandc/aica@0.1.75 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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