@yuandc/aica@0.1.80
AICA remote Agent worker
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest and runtime behavior are consistent with a user-started remote agent worker that uses local Codex tools and communicates with its configured ACA service. Login credentials are supplied for that service, and the insecure TLS option is guarded by an affirmative opt-in; no concrete attack was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes the CLI and only start/help scripts; the CLI dispatches commands when invoked.
- The flagged Codex path logic searches local installation paths and launches a local Codex process or app server.
- Codex session and provider helpers use local app-server requests, while the worker handles explicit service operations.
- Starting the worker sends machine, project, and provider presence to the configured ACA service; heartbeat sending requires a saved token.
- Login sends entered credentials to the selected or default ACA service. Certificate checks are bypassed only when ACA_SERVER_INSECURE_TLS is affirmatively enabled.
- Interactive Bash setup writes an app-specific rc file and passes it with --rcfile; it does not modify shell profiles.
Source & flagged code
3 flaggedA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.
dist/core/terminal/shell.jsView on unpkg · L2Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @yuandc/aica@0.1.80.
See all versions of @yuandc/aica for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @yuandc/aica@0.1.80 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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