The user’s WhatsApp account may follow a channel selected by the package publisher.
What to do: remove this version and, if it ran, rotate the credentials it could reach. Remediation↓
AI security review
scanned · by lpm-firewall-ai
The package automatically sends a WhatsApp newsletter FOLLOW request for a hard-coded target when the client socket is constructed. This performs an account action the user did not request, which meets the malicious account-action rule.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Application code constructs the message socket; the follow request is scheduled for 90 seconds later.
Mechanism
The newsletter socket decodes a hard-coded newsletter ID and submits a FOLLOW query without user input or consent.
Attack narrative
When an application constructs the message socket, the package constructs its newsletter socket and schedules a follow request after 90 seconds. The request uses a hard-coded newsletter ID and does not require a user action, so the package uses the account for a publisher-selected follow.
Avoid installing @zeppeliorg/wbails@1.0.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.