---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zeppeliorg/wbails"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zeppeliorg/wbails/v/1.1.0.md"
package: "@zeppeliorg/wbails"
report_status: "published"
title: "@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "1.1.0"
---

# @zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — The connected account follows channels selected by the package publisher without the user's request.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 1.1.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Socket construction automatically schedules WhatsApp FOLLOW actions for six hard-coded newsletters, using the user's connected account without a request. This is concrete, unauthorized account manipulation.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-10T02:16:15.142Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-10T02:17:25.333Z
- **Download time:** 771 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1525 ms
- **AI review time:** 67895 ms
- **Total time:** 70191 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatically follows six hard-coded WhatsApp newsletters using the user's connected account.

- **Trigger:** When the application creates the message socket; the follow requests are scheduled about 10 seconds later.

- **Impact:** The connected account follows channels selected by the package publisher without the user's request.

- **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/messages-send.js, lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/WABinary/jid-utils.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-10T02:17:25.333Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** makeMessagesSocket constructs makeNewsletterSocket, which schedules FOLLOW queries for hard-coded newsletter IDs and sends them to WhatsApp.

- **Attack narrative:** When a client creates the message socket, the package schedules six FOLLOW requests for hard-coded newsletter IDs. It sends those requests through WhatsApp using the connected account, without asking the user. This is an unsolicited account action toward targets chosen in the package source.

- **Rationale:** Socket construction automatically schedules WhatsApp FOLLOW actions for six hard-coded newsletters, using the user's connected account without a request. This is concrete, unauthorized account manipulation.

- **Files touched:** lib/Socket/messages-send.js, lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/WABinary/jid-utils.js

- **Network endpoints:** s.whatsapp.net

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 99.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** Creating the message socket automatically creates the newsletter socket, which schedules six FOLLOW operations for hard-coded newsletter IDs after a delay., Those operations pass the selected newsletter ID as newsletter\_id in a WhatsApp query sent to S\_WHATSAPP\_NET., The package therefore uses the connected WhatsApp account to follow publisher-selected newsletters without a user request.

- **Evidence against:** The preinstall script only checks that Node.js is version 20 or newer., The package describes itself as a library for interacting with WhatsApp Web, so its ordinary WhatsApp network access is expected.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0.

- Avoid installing @zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: High Secret
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/lib/Utils/validate-connection.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L107: pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 9. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 10. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 302
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 11. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** WAProto/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/WAProto/index.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 12145764
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. Medium: Git Dependency
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package manifest contains a git dependency.

### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/business.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/lib/Utils/business.js>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/lib/Utils/messages-media.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.2
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QHplcHBlbGlvcmcvd2JhaWxz:1.1.2
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Secret Pattern
- **Category:** Secrets
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zeppeliorg/wbails@1.1.0/lib/WABinary/constants.js>)

Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall, prepare
- **Dependencies:** 13
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 4
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 17

### Published dependency entries
- @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency)
- @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency)
- async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency)
- cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency)
- chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- libsignal github:tenka-san/libsignal-node (Dependency)
- lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency)
- music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency)
- p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency)
- pino ^9.6 (Dependency)
- protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency)
- whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency)
- ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency)
- audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency)
- jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency)
- link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency)
- sharp \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @zeppeliorg/wbails
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.1.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-06-24T08:37:00.701Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-10T02:16:39.303Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-16T17:30:31.115Z
- **Known versions:** 21
- **Latest version:** 0.0.1-security
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** A WebSockets library for interacting with WhatsApp Web
- **Author:** Rajeh Taher - 7eppsynC
- **Keywords:** @zeppeliorg, Xaz zepysK, 7eppsynC, wbails, baileys, WhatsApp, wa-bot, whatsapp api, whatsapp web, wa bot, whatsapp bot
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 114
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 17,564,969 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zeppeliorg/wbails/v/1.1.0>)
- [Repository](<https://www.npmjs.com/package/@zeppeliorg/wbails>)
- [OpenSSF/OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18925>)
- [WEB](<https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/>)
