---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board/v/0.7.0.md"
package: "@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board"
report_status: "published"
title: "@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.7.0"
---

# @zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 12 finding(s) warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse
- **Selected version:** 0.7.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Installing the package runs a postinstall hook that replaces dependencies nested under the Pi agent package. It invokes npm during installation and mutates the consumer dependency tree.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 83.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-10T02:22:44.892Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-10T02:23:43.801Z
- **Download time:** 1006 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1492 ms
- **AI review time:** 56409 ms
- **Total time:** 58909 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installing the package runs a postinstall hook that replaces dependencies nested under the Pi agent package. It invokes npm during installation and mutates the consumer dependency tree.

- **Trigger:** npm installation with lifecycle scripts enabled

- **Impact:** Can alter the installed Pi agent dependency tree outside the package lock and introduces install-time registry supply-chain exposure.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/patch-vulns.mjs

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-10T02:23:43.801Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** postinstall dependency replacement through npm and filesystem deletion

- **Rationale:** The source shows a transparent security-patch intent but performs unconsented postinstall mutation and a runtime package-manager download. No source evidence establishes credential theft, exfiltration, persistence, self-dependency, or broad AI-agent control-surface modification.

- **Files touched:** node\_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent/node\_modules/brace-expansion, node\_modules/@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent/node\_modules/protobufjs, .patch-tmp-brace-expansion, .patch-tmp-protobufjs

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 83.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** Installation automatically runs a package script., The install script deletes nested dependency directories., The install script downloads fixed packages and moves them into another package's dependency tree.

- **Evidence against:** The replacement versions are fixed and the nested install disables lifecycle scripts., No self-dependency, credential collection, data exfiltration, or remote payload execution was found in the inspected sources., The agent-board runtime writes to its own agent-board state area rather than modifying broad agent configuration.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of @zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/patch-vulns.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** runner/state-runner.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0/runner/state-runner.mjs>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L8: */
L9: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L10: import { readJson } from "../src/core/atomic.mjs";
```

### 4. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** src/core/auto-state.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0/src/core/auto-state.mjs>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L25: /** @param {NodeJS.ProcessEnv|Record<string,string|undefined>} [env] */
L26: export function autoStateEnabled(env = process.env) {
L27: const raw = env.AGENT_BOARD_AUTO_STATE ?? env.AGENT_VIEW_AUTO_STATE;
...
L298: try {
L299: const parsed = JSON.parse(candidate);
L300: if (parsed && typeof parsed === "object") return parsed;
```

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** scripts/patch-vulns.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0/scripts/patch-vulns.mjs>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L46: try {
L47: execSync(`npm install ${name}@${version} --prefix "${tmp}" --ignore-scripts`, {
L48: stdio: "pipe",
```

### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 12. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** src/ui/pty-attach.ts
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.7.0/src/ui/pty-attach.ts>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```typescript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @zhuxixi/pi-agent-board@0.5.1
matchedIdentity = npm:QHpodXhpeGkvcGktYWdlbnQtYm9hcmQ:0.5.1
similarity = 0.582
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 2
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 2
- **Development dependencies:** 5
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @xterm/headless ^6.0.0 (Dependency)
- node-pty ^1.1.0 (Dependency)
- @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent \* (PeerDependency)
- @earendil-works/pi-tui \* (PeerDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @zhuxixi/pi-agent-board
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.7.0
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-10T00:24:41.148Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-21T17:50:44.724Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-02T23:52:06.641Z
- **Known versions:** 13
- **Latest version:** 0.10.1
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Agent-board dashboard for Pi: dispatch, monitor, peek/reply, and attach to background Pi sessions.
- **Maintainers:** zhuxixi
- **Keywords:** pi-package, pi-extension, pi, pi-coding-agent, agent-board, background-agents, dashboard
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 158
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,774,823 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zhuxixi/pi-agent-board/v/0.7.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/zhuxixi/pi-agent-board>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/zhuxixi/pi-agent-board#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/zhuxixi/pi-agent-board/issues>)
