@zuplo/cli@7.2.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiDirect inspection shows a conventional user-invoked Zuplo CLI with no lifecycle hooks. Flagged network, machine-ID, shell, and file operations are scoped to telemetry, update checks, or explicit migration workflows and do not form a malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines no lifecycle scripts; zup is an explicit CLI bin.
- zup.js only imports dist/cli.js when the user invokes the CLI.
- Analytics is opt-out via ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK and records CLI telemetry to PostHog.
- The flagged shell call only checks Git status during an explicit migration command.
- Migration writes and deletes are confined to the user-selected project directory.
- No credential harvesting, covert exfiltration, remote code execution, or agent-control writes found.
Source & flagged code
2 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L650Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.
dist/common/analytics/lib.jsView on unpkg · L27Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.2.0.
See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.2.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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