@zuplo/cli@7.2.1
<p align="center"> <a href="https://zuplo.com"> <img src="https://portal.zuplo.com/zuplo.svg" height="96"> <h3 align="center">Zuplo</h3> </a> </p> <p align="center">Zuplo's API Gateway helps small and large teams get APIs to production that ar
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource shows a normal vendor CLI with no lifecycle hooks and no hidden import-time payload. Network, machine-ID, shell, and file-write behavior is tied to telemetry or clearly named user-invoked commands, with no concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- CLI telemetry derives a hashed machine identifier and can send invocation data to PostHog.
- The explicit dev-portal migration fetches Zudoku metadata/templates and writes generated project files.
- package.json has a bin entry but no preinstall, install, or postinstall hooks.
- The entrypoint only imports the CLI after direct zup invocation.
- Telemetry honors ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK and is package-aligned.
- Migration is bound to the explicit source migrate dev-portal command and its supplied directory.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L650The explicit dev-portal migration fetches Zudoku metadata/templates and writes generated project files.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L513Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.2.1.
See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.2.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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