@zuplo/cli@7.3.0
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AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged primitives are normal, user-invoked CLI functionality with declared endpoints and scoped project migration. Direct inspection found no lifecycle hook or concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Runtime CLI telemetry uses PostHog unless ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK is set.
- The explicit dev-portal migration fetches Zudoku metadata and writes project files.
- package.json declares only a zup bin and no lifecycle scripts.
- Mutation is reachable through the explicit source migrate dev-portal command; --force defaults false.
- Migration changes are scoped to the selected project’s docs/config files.
- No source evidence of install-time execution, credential exfiltration, stealth persistence, or AI-agent control-surface writes.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L650The explicit dev-portal migration fetches Zudoku metadata and writes project files.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L491Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.3.0.
See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.3.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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