@zuplo/cli@7.5.2
<p align="center"> <a href="https://zuplo.com"> <img src="https://portal.zuplo.com/zuplo.svg" height="96"> <h3 align="center">Zuplo</h3> </a> </p> <p align="center">Zuplo's API Gateway helps small and large teams get APIs to production that ar
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no lifecycle hook or covert execution chain, but it did confirm telemetry tied to a host identifier and a user-invoked remote template write. The package is therefore suspicious as a privacy and remote-content risk, not proven malware.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs zup, or explicitly invokes the developer-portal migration command.
Impact
Usage, command, and optional project metadata can be transmitted; a changed remote migration template could affect the generated project file.
Mechanism
Host fingerprinting and telemetry capture; remote template download during migration.
AI rationale
Source inspection found no lifecycle hook or covert execution chain, but it did confirm telemetry tied to a host identifier and a user-invoked remote template write. The package is therefore suspicious as a privacy and remote-content risk, not proven malware.
Evidence
dist/common/analytics/lib.jsdist/common/machine-id/lib.jsdist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsdocs/tsconfig.json
Network endpoints2
app.posthog.comcdn.jsdelivr.net
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 78.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI initializes PostHog telemetry and sends a machine-derived identifier, command event, and optional account or project fields.
- The machine identifier is derived from operating-system machine identifiers or hostname through a shell command.
- The migration command fetches a remote template and writes it into the selected project directory.
Evidence against
- package.json defines no preinstall, install, or postinstall lifecycle script.
- The published entry point is a user-invoked zup command.
- Project file deletion is confined to named legacy developer-portal files during migration.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
20 flaggeddist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView file
1import { exec } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/lint/handler.jsView file
1import path from "node:path";
L2: import { execa } from "execa";
L3: import { shutdownAnalytics } from "../common/analytics/lib.js";
High
node_modules/pino/benchmarks/utils/wrap-log-level.jsView file
Findings
2 Critical11 High8 Medium7 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/zeno.js
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodenode_modules/@zuplo/editor/dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.js
HighChild Processdist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js
HighShelldist/lint/handler.js
HighSame File Env Network Executionnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencenode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
HighCloud Metadata Accessnode_modules/@zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-HEFHZ2HU.js
HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/common/analytics/lib.js
High
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.5.2.
See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.5.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.