registry / Data exfiltration / @zuplo/cli / 7.6.7

@zuplo/cli@7.6.7

<p align="center"> <a href="https://zuplo.com"> <img src="https://portal.zuplo.com/zuplo.svg" height="96"> <h3 align="center">Zuplo</h3> </a> </p> <p align="center">Zuplo's API Gateway helps small and large teams get APIs to production that ar

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

There is no concrete malware chain or install-hook abuse, but default network telemetry tied to a persistent machine identifier is a real privacy-sensitive capability. The remaining opaque bundled and binary content makes a clean verdict unsafe under this review's constraints.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

An explicit invocation of the zup CLI that emits an analytics event.

Impact

It may disclose stable device correlation data and supplied account, project, user, or CI metadata.

Mechanism

PostHog telemetry with a machine-derived identifier.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/common/analytics/lib.jsdist/common/machine-id/lib.jsdist/common/constants.js

Network endpoints1

app.posthog.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 72.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI sends product analytics to PostHog unless the user sets an opt-out environment variable.
Analytics attaches a machine-derived identifier and can attach supplied user, account, project, and CI values.
The package ships large minified bundled dependencies and a non-UTF8 ZIP fixture, preventing a complete source-level clean finding.

Evidence against

The manifest exposes a CLI command and contains no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The launcher only imports the CLI after the user runs the command.
The migration and lint actions are explicit command handlers, not install-time behavior.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 219 file(s), 593 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.example.com, api.prod.example.com, app.posthog.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, cdn.zuplo.com, dev.zuplo.com, developer.test, example.com, gateway.example.com, github.com, httpproblems.com, learn.microsoft.com, my-api-dev-123abc.zuplo.app, my-api.zuplo.app, my-api.zuplo.dev, portal.zuplo.com, registry.npmjs.org, your-api-123abc.zuplo.app, zuplo.com

Source & flagged code

20 flagged

dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView file

1import { exec } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/lint/handler.jsView file

1import path from "node:path"; L2: import { execa } from "execa"; L3: import { shutdownAnalytics } from "../common/analytics/lib.js";

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/lint/handler.jsView on unpkg · L1

node_modules/pino/benchmarks/utils/wrap-log-level.jsView file

Findings

2 Critical11 High8 Medium7 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/zeno.js

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodenode_modules/@zuplo/editor/dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.js

HighChild Processdist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js

HighShelldist/lint/handler.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencenode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js

HighCloud Metadata Accessnode_modules/@zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-ZZCZZHOD.js

HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/common/analytics/lib.js

High

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.6.7.

See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.6.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-14 02:41:04.388Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

registry / Data exfiltration / @zuplo/cli / 7.6.7

@zuplo/cli@7.6.7

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

An explicit invocation of the zup CLI that emits an analytics event.

Impact

It may disclose stable device correlation data and supplied account, project, user, or CI metadata.

Mechanism

PostHog telemetry with a machine-derived identifier.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/common/analytics/lib.jsdist/common/machine-id/lib.jsdist/common/constants.js

Network endpoints1

app.posthog.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 72.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The CLI sends product analytics to PostHog unless the user sets an opt-out environment variable.
Analytics attaches a machine-derived identifier and can attach supplied user, account, project, and CI values.
The package ships large minified bundled dependencies and a non-UTF8 ZIP fixture, preventing a complete source-level clean finding.

Evidence against

The manifest exposes a CLI command and contains no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The launcher only imports the CLI after the user runs the command.
The migration and lint actions are explicit command handlers, not install-time behavior.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

Source & flagged code

20 flagged

dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView file

1import { exec } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/lint/handler.jsView file

1import path from "node:path"; L2: import { execa } from "execa"; L3: import { shutdownAnalytics } from "../common/analytics/lib.js";

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/lint/handler.jsView on unpkg · L1

node_modules/pino/benchmarks/utils/wrap-log-level.jsView file

Findings

2 Critical11 High8 Medium7 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/zeno.js

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodenode_modules/@zuplo/editor/dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.js

HighChild Processdist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js

HighShelldist/lint/handler.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencenode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js

HighCloud Metadata Accessnode_modules/@zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-ZZCZZHOD.js

HighCopied Package Dependency Bridgedist/common/analytics/lib.js

High

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.6.7.

See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.6.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-14 02:41:04.388Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.