@zuplo/cli@7.7.9
<p align="center"> <a href="https://zuplo.com"> <img src="https://portal.zuplo.com/zuplo.svg" height="96"> <h3 align="center">Zuplo</h3> </a> </p> <p align="center">Zuplo's API Gateway helps small and large teams get APIs to production that ar
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no automatic lifecycle hook or demonstrated malicious install chain. Its user-invoked telemetry and remote template writes are concrete capabilities with residual privacy and supply-chain risk.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- CLI telemetry derives a stable hashed machine identifier and sends events to PostHog unless the user sets ZUPLO_DO_NOT_TRACK.
- The dev-portal migration command downloads templates from jsDelivr and writes generated project files.
- Bundled runtime code reads process and dotenv environment values when its runtime is launched.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or prepare lifecycle hook.
- The observed network and file operations are tied to invoked CLI commands rather than package installation.
- No source evidence established secret exfiltration, stealth persistence, or destructive automatic behavior.
Source & flagged code
20 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L650Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.7.9.
See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.7.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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