registry / @zuplo/cli / 7.8.22
@zuplo/cli@7.8.22
⚠ Under review<p align="center"> <a href="https://zuplo.com"> <img src="https://portal.zuplo.com/zuplo.svg" height="96"> <h3 align="center">Zuplo</h3> </a> </p> <p align="center">Zuplo's API Gateway helps small and large teams get APIs to production that ar
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspection did not establish independent behavior warranting a warning or block. Manual review is required because the mandated nine-path clean citation coverage cannot fit within the eight-citation limit.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
CLI invocation activates command handling and telemetry; no attack trigger was established.
Impact
No malicious impact was demonstrated by static inspection.
Mechanism
Inspected behavior includes project migration, telemetry, hashed machine identification, and bundled runtime utilities.
AI rationale
Inspection did not establish independent behavior warranting a warning or block. Manual review is required because the mandated nine-path clean citation coverage cannot fit within the eight-citation limit.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Manual Review at 96.0% confidence as Unknown with high false-positive risk.
AI review observations
- The required clean coverage contains nine distinct paths, exceeding the eight-citation limit.
- package.json declares the zup executable and contains no lifecycle hooks or runtime self-dependency.
- Analytics supports an environment-based opt-out; machine identification hashes the platform identifier.
- A bundled archive helper interpolates paths into a shell command, but inspection found no invoking caller establishing an active attack.
Evidence against
- Inspected source did not establish malicious installation, credential exfiltration, or agent control-surface mutation.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
21 flaggeddist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView file
1import { exec } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L120};
L21: const execAsync = promisify(exec);
L22: export const migrateDevPortal = async (args) => {
High
Shell
Package source references shell execution.
dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.jsView on unpkg · L20node_modules/pino/benchmarks/utils/wrap-log-level.jsView file
6const code = readFileSync(
L7: join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'node_modules', 'loglevel', 'lib', 'loglevel.js')
L8: )
...
L50: if (require.main === module) {
L51: const loglevel = build(process.stdout)
L52: loglevel.info('hello')
Findings
3 Critical11 High8 Medium7 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-OABXMALF.js
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/zeno.js
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodenode_modules/@zuplo/editor/dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.js
HighChild Processdist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js
HighShelldist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js
HighSame File Env Network Executionnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencenode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationnode_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
HighCloud Metadata Accessnode_modules/@zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-OABXMALF.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.8.22.
See all versions of @zuplo/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.8.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.