---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zuplo/cli/v/7.9.6"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zuplo/cli/v/7.9.6.md"
package: "@zuplo/cli"
report_status: "under_review"
title: "@zuplo/cli@7.9.6 npm security report"
verdict: "manual_review"
version: "7.9.6"
---

# @zuplo/cli@7.9.6 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 28 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed.

- **Verdict:** Manual Review
- **Product-default install policy:** Allow
- **Firewall policy:** No policy match
- **Public report status:** Under Review
- **Threat category:** Unknown
- **Selected version:** 7.9.6
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: manual review; recommendation: manual review. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Inspected source does not independently justify a warning or block, and scanner labels alone do not prove malicious behavior. Manual review is required because nine mandatory clean citation paths cannot fit within the eight-citation limit.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Manual Review
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 97.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-02T23:49:18.019Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-02T23:52:01.231Z
- **Download time:** 12030 ms
- **Static scan time:** 52697 ms
- **AI review time:** 98484 ms
- **Total time:** 163212 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No concrete attack was established by the inspected source. The archive contains a small stream worker fixture, while inspected execution and environment handling serve CLI and development functions.

- **Trigger:** CLI invocation activates the inspected command and telemetry behavior; no root install hook was found.

- **Impact:** No malicious impact was established. A clean decision cannot satisfy the required citation coverage within the output limit.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-02T23:52:01.231Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Inspected code loads project environment values, invokes local workers, migrates portal files, and records telemetry.

- **Rationale:** Inspected source does not independently justify a warning or block, and scanner labels alone do not prove malicious behavior. Manual review is required because nine mandatory clean citation paths cannot fit within the eight-citation limit.

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Manual Review

- **Confidence:** 97.0%

- **Recommended action:** manual\_review

- **Intent class:** Unknown

- **False-positive risk:** High

- **AI review observations:** The manifest exposes zup.js as the CLI and contains no lifecycle scripts or runtime self-dependency., Zeno passes loaded environment values to the local worker request handler; the inspected behavior does not establish external credential exfiltration., Analytics supports an environment-based tracking opt-out, and machine identification hashes the platform identifier., The required clean citation coverage spans nine distinct paths, exceeding the eight-citation limit.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @zuplo/cli@7.9.6.

- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/cli@7.9.6 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: import { exec } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, stat, unlink, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";
```

### 2. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/dist/source/migrate/dev-portal/handler.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L20: };
L21: const execAsync = promisify(exec);
L22: export const migrateDevPortal = async (args) => {
```

### 3. Medium: Unsafe Vm Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 68.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/pino/benchmarks/utils/wrap-log-level.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/pino/benchmarks/utils/wrap-log-level.js>)

Package source executes code through a VM context API.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const code = readFileSync(
L7: join(__dirname, '..', '..', 'node_modules', 'loglevel', 'lib', 'loglevel.js')
L8: )
...
L50: if (require.main === module) {
L51: const loglevel = build(process.stdout)
L52: loglevel.info('hello')
```

### 4. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/prettier/internal/experimental-cli.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/prettier/internal/experimental-cli.mjs>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: const __filename = __prettierFileUrlToPath(import.meta.url);
L6: const __dirname = __prettierDirname(__filename);
L7: 
...
L107: const buffer2 = attempt(() => fs2.readFileSync(path18), Buffer2.alloc(0));
L108: const content = attempt(() => JSON.parse(buffer2.toString()), {});
L109: return { path: path18, buffer: buffer2, content };
...
L126: const folderPath = path2.dirname(filePath);
L127: const pkg = dist_default2("package.json", folderPath);
L128: return pkg?.content;
...
L142: ARGV = globalThis.process?.argv || [];
L143: ENABLED = !("NO_COLOR" in ENV) && ENV.COLOR !== "0" && ENV.TERM !== "dumb" && !ARGV.includes("--no-color") && !ARGV.includes("--no-colors") && (ENV.COLOR === "1" || !globalThis.pro...
L144: }
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L128: `)}r.writeSync(fe,`]
L129: `),r.closeSync(fe),Ic("endDumpTypes"),Dd("Dump types","beginDumpTypes","endDumpTypes")}t(Q,"dumpTypes");function ne(){_&&r.writeFileSync(_,JSON.stringify(h))}t(ne,"dumpLegend"),e.d...
L130: `,ct=m;continue}m++}return F.assert(jt!==void 0),P=mt,jt}t(ie,"scanTemplateAndSetTokenValue");function Ne(le){let $e=m;if(m++,m>=T)return ee(v.Unexpected_end_of_text),"";let ct=ne(...
```

### 9. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/zeno.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/zeno.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L24: 
L25: var Ue=Object.defineProperty;var n=(t,e)=>Ue(t,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0});import{scheduler as Ge}from"node:timers/promises";Object.defineProperty(globalThis,"scheduler",{val...
L26: `),nt=$.encode("*"),ot=$.encode("$");function oe(t){let e=[nt,$.encode(t.length.toString()),J];for(let r of t){let o=r instanceof Uint8Array?r:$.encode(r.toString());e.push(ot,$.en...
L27: `);#n=new Set([..."[]{}:,/",...this.#t]);#e;#r;#s;constructor(e){this.#e=`${e}`,this.#r=this.#e.length,this.#s=this.#l()}parse(){let e=this.#o(),r=this.#i(e),{done:o,value:s}=this....
```

### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
node_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js:
`;case 118:return"\v";case 102:return"\f";case 114:return"\r";case 101:return"\x1B";case 32:return" ";case 34:return'"';case 47:return"/";case 92:return"\\";case 78:return"\x85";ca...
`+new Array(y).join(" ")+"^"}}return null}t(npt,"getErrorSource");function tmr(s){var o=npt(s),f=Kdr();f&&f._handle&&f._handle.setBlocking&&f._handle.setBlocking(!0),o&&(console.er...
`),r.closeSync(fe),Ic("endDumpTypes"),Dd("Dump types","beginDumpTypes","endDumpTypes")}t(Q,"dumpTypes");function ne(){_&&r.writeFileSync(_,JSON.stringify(h))}t(ne,"dumpLegend"),e.d...
`)),a}t(_4,"getTextOfNodeFromSourceText"
```

### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L128: `)}r.writeSync(fe,`]
L129: `),r.closeSync(fe),Ic("endDumpTypes"),Dd("Dump types","beginDumpTypes","endDumpTypes")}t(Q,"dumpTypes");function ne(){_&&r.writeFileSync(_,JSON.stringify(h))}t(ne,"dumpLegend"),e.d...
L130: `,ct=m;continue}m++}return F.assert(jt!==void 0),P=mt,jt}t(ie,"scanTemplateAndSetTokenValue");function Ne(le){let $e=m;if(m++,m>=T)return ee(v.Unexpected_end_of_text),"";let ct=ne(...
```

### 12. High: Cloud Metadata Access
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-233GXONP.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/runtime/out/esm/chunk-233GXONP.js>)

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L24: 
L25: import{c as Xe,d as $I,e as Mr,f as Ze,h as qg,i as Dg}from"./chunk-54HRCPVQ.js";import{a as Fe}from"./chunk-QGAJTUPE.js";import{A as m,B as Lc,C as et,D as ks,F as tt,G as Mt,H as...
L26: `)}i(Ls,"extractAllText");async function*VD(t,e){let n=sn(t),o=e.clone().body;if(!o||!n)return;let r=o.getReader(),s=new TextDecoder,a="";try{for(;;){let{done:c,value:u}=await r.re...
...
L29: `).filter(d=>d.startsWith("data:")).map(d=>d.slice(5).trim());if(n.length===0)return null;let o=n.join(`
L30: `);if(o==="[DONE]")return{raw:"[DONE]",done:!0};let r;try{r=JSON.parse(o)}catch{return{raw:o}}let s=r,a=e==="openai-responses"?s?.response:e==="anthropic-messages"?s?.message:void ...
L31: `).filter(e=>!e.trim().startsWith("at async file")).map((e,n)=>{let o=e.replaceAll(p$,"").replaceAll(m$,"").
```

### 13. High: Copied Package Dependency Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 83.0%
- **Path:** dist/common/analytics/lib.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/dist/common/analytics/lib.js>)

Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
package = @zuplo/cli; repositoryIdentity = zuplo; dependency = posthog-node
L27: try {
L28: const { PostHog } = await import("posthog-node");
L29: _postHog = new PostHog(POST_HOG_CAPTURE_KEY, {
```

### 14. Critical: Trojan Source Unicode
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/editor/dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/editor/dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.js>)

Source contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: contains invisible/control Unicode U+200B (zero width space)
                             height: `+(r-t)+`px`))}function d(t,n,r){var a=R(i,t),o=a.text.length,d,f;function p(n,r){return jr(e,B(t,n),`div`,a,r)}function m(t,n,r){var i=Lr(e,a,null,t),o=n==`ltr`==(r==`after`)?`left`:`right`;return p(r==
```

### 15. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: node_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js spawns node_modules/@zuplo/core/index.minified.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L24: 
L25: // Needed because of https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/issues/1944
L26: import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
...
L30: const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
L31: const __dirname = dirname(__filename);
L32: 
L33: var eGt=Object.create;var rV=Object.defineProperty;var tGt=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var rGt=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var nGt=Object.getPrototypeOf,iGt=Object.prototype.has...
L34: `):f+=y;return f}t(Srt,"highlight");var hrt=!1,grt=/\r\n|[\n\r\u2028\u2029]/;function UGt(s,o,f,d){let y=Object.assign({column:0,line:-1},s.start),E=Object.assign({},y,s.end),{
```

### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> zup.js -> dist/cli.js -> dist/cmds/build.js -> dist/build/handler.js -> node_modules/@zuplo/core/customer.cli.minified.js
L128: `)}r.writeSync(fe,`]
L129: `),r.closeSync(fe),Ic("endDumpTypes"),Dd("Dump types","beginDumpTypes","endDumpTypes")}t(Q,"dumpTypes");function ne(){_&&r.writeFileSync(_,JSON.stringify(h))}t(ne,"dumpLegend"),e.d...
L130: `,ct=m;continue}m++}return F.assert(jt!==void 0),P=mt,jt}t(ie,"scanTemplateAndSetTokenValue");function Ne(le){let $e=m;if(m++,m>=T)return ee(v.Unexpected_end_of_text),"";let ct=ne(...
```

### 17. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 18. Low: Telemetry
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs.

### 19. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 20. Medium: Ships Wasm Module
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/source-map/lib/mappings.wasm
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/source-map/lib/mappings.wasm>)

Package ships WebAssembly modules.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = node_modules/source-map/lib/mappings.wasm
kind = wasm_module
sizeBytes = 48526
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 21. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/pino/inc-version.sh
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/pino/inc-version.sh>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```shell
path = node_modules/pino/inc-version.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 821
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 22. Medium: Ships Compressed Blob
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/thread-stream/test/dir with spaces/test-package.zip
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/thread-stream/test/dir%20with%20spaces/test-package.zip>)

Package ships compressed or archive-like blobs.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = node_modules/thread-stream/test/dir with spaces/test-package.zip
kind = compressed_blob
sizeBytes = 349
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 23. High: Payload In Excluded Dir
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/thread-stream/test/dir with spaces/test-package.zip
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/thread-stream/test/dir%20with%20spaces/test-package.zip>)

Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = node_modules/thread-stream/test/dir with spaces/test-package.zip
kind = payload_in_excluded_dir
sizeBytes = 349
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 24. Medium: Oversized Source File
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/@zuplo/core/index.minified.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/%40zuplo/core/index.minified.js>)

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
path = node_modules/@zuplo/core/index.minified.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 5032123
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 25. Low: Nested Archive Needs Inspection
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 80.0%
- **Path:** node\_modules/thread-stream/test/dir with spaces/test-package.zip
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/node_modules/thread-stream/test/dir%20with%20spaces/test-package.zip>)

Package ships a nested archive or MCP bundle that was inventoried but not recursively analyzed.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
path = node_modules/thread-stream/test/dir with spaces/test-package.zip
kind = nested_archive_needs_inspection
sizeBytes = 349
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 26. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 27. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

### 28. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/common/machine-id/lib.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@zuplo/cli@7.9.6/dist/common/machine-id/lib.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 87
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 40
- **Optional dependencies:** 5
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 45

### Published dependency entries
- @inquirer/prompts 8.5.2 (Dependency)
- @opentelemetry/api 1.9.0 (Dependency)
- @opentelemetry/api-logs 0.220.0 (Dependency)
- @swc/core 1.10.18 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/core 7.9.6 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/editor 1.0.33162667821 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/graphql 7.9.6 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/openapi-tools 7.9.6 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/otel 7.9.6 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/runtime 7.9.6 (Dependency)
- chalk 5.4.1 (Dependency)
- chokidar 3.5.3 (Dependency)
- cookie 1.0.2 (Dependency)
- deno 2.8.3 (Dependency)
- dotenv 16.5.0 (Dependency)
- esbuild 0.28.1 (Dependency)
- execa 6.1.0 (Dependency)
- fast-glob 3.3.3 (Dependency)
- ignore 5.3.1 (Dependency)
- javascript-stringify 2.1.0 (Dependency)
- jose 5.9.2 (Dependency)
- js-yaml 4.3.2 (Dependency)
- jsonc-parser 3.2.0 (Dependency)
- jsonpath-plus 10.3.0 (Dependency)
- minimatch 10.2.5 (Dependency)
- open 10.1.0 (Dependency)
- ora 8.2.0 (Dependency)
- pino 10.3.1 (Dependency)
- pino-pretty 13.1.3 (Dependency)
- posthog-node 5.38.1 (Dependency)
- prettier 3.8.1 (Dependency)
- rimraf 6.0.1 (Dependency)
- semver 7.6.3 (Dependency)
- simple-git 3.36.0 (Dependency)
- strip-ansi 7.1.0 (Dependency)
- tar 7.5.22 (Dependency)
- undici 7.29.0 (Dependency)
- workerd 1.20250821.0 (Dependency)
- yargs 17.7.2 (Dependency)
- zod 4.4.3 (Dependency)
- @zuplo/lint-darwin-arm64 7.9.6 (OptionalDependency)
- @zuplo/lint-darwin-x64 7.9.6 (OptionalDependency)
- @zuplo/lint-linux-arm64 7.9.6 (OptionalDependency)
- @zuplo/lint-linux-x64 7.9.6 (OptionalDependency)
- @zuplo/lint-win32-x64 7.9.6 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @zuplo/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 7.9.6
- **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE.txt
- **Version published:** 2026-10-02T23:47:57.336Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T01:55:45.107Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-03T23:22:56.105Z
- **Known versions:** 109
- **Latest version:** 7.13.13
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** \<p align="center"\> \<a href="https://zuplo.com"\> \<img src="https://portal.zuplo.com/zuplo.svg" height="96"\> \<h3 align="center"\>Zuplo\</h3\> \</a\> \</p\> \<p align="center"\>Zuplo's API Gateway helps small and large teams get APIs to production that ar
- **Author:** Zuplo, Inc.
- **Maintainers:** ntotten, zuplo-integrations, vazexqi
- **Runtime engines:** npm: \>=10, node: \>=24.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 13275
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 126,133,677 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@zuplo/cli/v/7.9.6>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/zuplo/zuplo>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/zuplo/zuplo#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/zuplo/zuplo/issues>)