@zuplo/editor@1.0.35228373935
Local development editor for the Zuplo CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner matches resolve to editor features and bundled language-tooling data. MCP bearer tokens pass through a package-aligned proxy as part of requests to the user-configured target, with no inspected evidence of an unrelated recipient or malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes editor modules and has no install lifecycle hook.
- The IDE matches are editor-opening metadata and cursor styling; CodeMirror handles invisible and bidirectional characters, while the TypeScript worker’s child_process match is in a Node module-name catalog.
- MCP authentication uses an OAuth access token for a user-configured server. The client routes requests through Zuplo’s MCP proxy, passes the selected target URL, and omits browser cookies; the inspected code establishes no unrelated credential recipient.
- The MCP bearer token is sent through Zuplo’s proxy, so that service handles the token as part of forwarding requests to the configured MCP server.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/client/static/js/main-BcNxyjY5.jsView on unpkg · L1572A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/client/static/js/main-BcNxyjY5.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/editor@1.0.35228373935.
See all versions of @zuplo/editor for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/editor@1.0.35228373935 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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