@zuplo/editor@1.0.36501657731
Local development editor for the Zuplo CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest and inspected entrypoint and bundle source support normal local editor functionality. The scanner flags resolve to IDE detection metadata, editor cursor styling, Unicode-character detection, and standard language-service features.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest describes a local development editor and exports local modules; the inspected manifest has no install lifecycle scripts.
- The flagged `.cursor` match is an IDE detection entry, and the other flagged cursor match is part of editor cursor styling.
- The editor preference route validates the selected editor, and its open route constructs an editor URL from the requested file path.
- The browser bundle maps to editor assets; its static bearer auth provider does not save OAuth tokens.
- The CodeMirror bundle detects Unicode control characters, while the JSON worker provides language-service schema fetching.
- The TypeScript worker implements a language service and loads a custom worker only when a caller supplies a custom worker path.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedSource contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.
dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.jsView on unpkg · L7Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/editor@1.0.36501657731.
See all versions of @zuplo/editor for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/editor@1.0.36501657731 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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