@zuplo/editor@1.0.39729182240
Local development editor for the Zuplo CLI
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install hooks or malicious behavior. The flagged Unicode and worker code correspond to normal editor layout and language-service functions, while assistant requests are user-triggered and sent to the configured Zuplo worker.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exports local editor entrypoints and declares no lifecycle hooks.
- The app routes requests through its editor API and serves its local interface.
- The assistant defaults to a Zuplo hosted worker; overrides are limited to localhost or the worker host family.
- A user-submitted message sends the prompt and Zuplo account, project, and session context with a bearer token to the assistant API.
- The JSON worker enables network fetches only when schema requests are enabled.
- The flagged invisible character is used in an editor layout probe; the flagged TypeScript worker contains module-analysis logic.
- The flagged Unicode character has a visible editor-layout purpose, and the worker code is consistent with bundled editor language services.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedSource contains bidi control or invisible Unicode characters associated with Trojan Source attacks.
dist/client/static/js/codemirror-6ITIKbGP.jsView on unpkg · L7Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zuplo/editor@1.0.39729182240.
See all versions of @zuplo/editor for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @zuplo/editor@1.0.39729182240 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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