registry / a.poltoradnev-package-c / 0.0.2

a.poltoradnev-package-c@0.0.2

Shared poltoradnev package c library for backend integration

AI Security Review

scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing the package silently runs _polyfill.js. It retrieves a remote binary, writes it under a temporary path, makes it executable on Unix, and starts it detached.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Any runtime require/import of the main entrypoint.

Impact

Arbitrary attacker-controlled native code executes under the importing process's user account.

Mechanism

Remote binary download, drop, chmod, and detached execution.

Attack narrative

At module import, index.js suppresses errors while loading _polyfill.js. That file contacts obfuscated worker hosts for a platform-specific payload, or reconstructs one from DNS TXT records. If the payload exceeds a size threshold, it writes it to a randomized temporary filename, sets Unix execute permissions, and launches it detached through cmd.exe or /bin/sh. This is a concrete remote-code-execution chain without user consent.

Rationale

The malicious execution chain is reachable at normal import time, not merely dormant in an unused helper. Remote content has no integrity validation before execution.

Evidence

index.js_polyfill.jslib/telemetry.jspackage.json

Network endpoints7

oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev/pkg/packageoob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev/pkg/package/pkg/package

index.js (the package main) require()s setup.js, which schedules bootstrap() on process.nextTick, so the dropper fires on any require() of the package. bootstrap() loads lib/telemetry.js which performs an HTTPS GET of a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) against a rotating list of Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with DNS-based fallbacks tin.dl.well1.site, tina.dl.well1.site, ldr.dl.well1.site, win.dl.well1.site. The response body is base64-decoded, written to /var/tmp or %TEMP%, chmod'd 0755, and executed via child_process. The child_process import, fs.chmodSync call, os.hostname/platform/userInfo accesses, and every destination hostname are string-concatenated at runtime (e.g. require('child_'+'process'), ['oob-wor','ker.cf',...].join('')) to defeat static scanners. setup.js additionally computes a SHA-256 install fingerprint from os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.version, and process.pid and transmits it as installId to the same author-controlled endpoints that serve the executable payload. The delivered bytes, host, and path are unpinned and unverified (no hash or signature check); the destination Cloudflare Workers subdomains are anonymous infrastructure unrelated to any documented publisher.

a.poltoradnev-package-c@0.0.2

AI Security Review

OSV Corroboration

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code