accounts-final-form@34.2.5

Requiring accounts-final-form auto-runs setup.js via process.nextTick(bootstrap) in index.js. setup.js selects a platform-specific asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe), fetches it from a list of obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev) with DNS fallback to *.dl.well1.site, stages the file under /var/tmp or %TEMP%, chmods it 0755, and executes it via child_process. Destination hostnames and dangerous APIs are constructed by string-splitting and.join("") to evade static analysis (e.g. require("child_"+"process"), os["plat"+"form"], fs["chmod"+"Sync"]). setup.js additionally computes an install fingerprint from os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.version, and process.pid, hashes it to 16 hex characters, and sends it as installId in the request to the same Workers hosts, enabling per-victim identification. The package's advertised purpose is a vacuous "Accounts final form runtime support module" that does not justify pulling native binaries from anonymous workers.dev subdomains and executing them. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3119fb8dbf1b8a8b5c69c7fd4212673ce6a7d2c52c4fa06a7a498e97c15897f0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.