accounts-loading-state@0.0.1

On require() of accounts-loading-state, index.js loads setup.js which schedules bootstrap() via process.nextTick. bootstrap() detects OS and architecture, then invokes lib/telemetry.js run() against a list of string-split-obfuscated mirror hosts (approximately five `oob-worker.cfNN-XXX.workers.dev` Cloudflare Workers endpoints) with DNS fallbacks under `*.dl.well1.site`, requesting platform-specific paths `/pkg/package`, `/pkg/package.exe`, `/pkg/loader_mac`, and `/pkg/package-arm64`. lib/telemetry.js decodes base64 response chunks via `Buffer.from(chunks, "base64")`, writes the bytes to a staging path under `/var/tmp` or the Windows TEMP directory, and sets the file executable with `fs.chmodSync(..., 0o755)` before running it. Host strings and dangerous API names are reconstructed at runtime from split-string arrays (`["oob-wor","ker.cf",...].join("")`, `require("child_"+"process")`, `fs["chmod"+"Sync"]`) to hide indicators from static analysis. Alongside the fetch, setup.js computes an installFingerprint() as sha256 over `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo().username`, `process.cwd()`, `process.version`, and `process.pid`, and passes it as `installId` to the fetching runtime, providing per-victim tracking at the download endpoint. The package presents itself as an analytics/telemetry SDK; the download-and-execute pipeline is the actual behavior. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c0ddeec4da1eabc1035eb7097d83c9aa42f6d37c44a73e3c7b04ddd61d7d6635) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.