accounts-loading-state@34.7.7

On require() of the package, index.js loads setup.js which selects a per-platform asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe) and invokes lib/telemetry.js via process.nextTick. telemetry.js fetches the binary bytes from a rotating pool of Cloudflare Worker subdomains under oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev (with a DNS failover under *.dl.well1.site), base64-decodes them, writes them to disk, fs.chmodSync's them to 0755, and executes them via child_process. Host names and dangerous API identifiers are assembled by string-fragment concatenation to defeat naive scanners: ["oob-wor","ker.cf","99-9b3.wor","kers",".dev"].join(""), require("child_"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"], os["host"+"name"]. setup.js also builds an installFingerprint from os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), process.version and pid (SHA-256, first 16 hex chars) and sends it as installId to the same endpoints. The package advertises itself as an accounts-loading-state adapter and has no purpose that requires downloading and executing platform-specific binaries from anonymous Cloudflare Worker subdomains. Consequence of installing or importing this package: attacker-controlled native code executes on the host with the privileges of the Node.js process. ## Source: ghsa-malware (c0ddeec4da1eabc1035eb7097d83c9aa42f6d37c44a73e3c7b04ddd61d7d6635) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.