aclade-agent@1.2.3
Aclade Local AI Agent Connector
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource establishes conditional forwarding of an existing service credential to an unrestricted operator-configured endpoint. The runtime agent capabilities and absence of install hooks do not support a malicious verdict.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Run the agent with --host pointing elsewhere while an existing token is available.
Impact
The selected endpoint can obtain the existing service credential.
Mechanism
Host selection does not bind the saved token to its original service; polling sends it as a bearer credential.
AI rationale
Source establishes conditional forwarding of an existing service credential to an unrestricted operator-configured endpoint. The runtime agent capabilities and absence of install hooks do not support a malicious verdict.
Evidence
src/index.tsdist/index.js.aclade-agent.json
Network endpoints1
aclade.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The agent reads its saved configuration and reuses a stored token when no new token is supplied.
- The --host option selects an unrestricted destination independently of the reused token.
- The active poll loop sends that token in the Authorization header through an HTTP or HTTPS request.
- The entrypoint requires a token and starts the poll loop when the agent runs.
- The manifest defines build and start scripts without install lifecycle hooks.
Evidence against
- Shell execution, file access, browser automation, and package self-updates follow the agent's runtime tool structure.
- No hidden recipient or concrete malicious install behavior was identified.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
4 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
38const https = __importStar(require("https"));
L39: const child_process = __importStar(require("child_process"));
L40: const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));
High
61* The agent already self-updates through npm, so telling a customer to run
L62: * `npx playwright install` by hand was busywork we could just do. playwright-core
L63: * ships the same installer the `playwright` package exposes, so we invoke it
...
L74: console.log("=> Preparing the browser (one-time download, ~50MB)…");
L75: const proc = child_process.spawn(process.execPath, [cli, "install", "chromium", "--only-shell", "--no-progress"], {
L76: stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
High
Runtime Package Install
Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L61src/index.tsView file
512const proc = child_process.spawn(input.command, [], { // nosemgrep: javascript.lang.security.detect-child-process.detect-child-process
L513: shell: true,
L514: cwd: input.cwd ? resolvePath(input.cwd) : workspaceRoot,
Findings
3 High4 Medium5 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighShellsrc/index.ts
HighRuntime Package Installdist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumAi Review Evidencesrc/index.ts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aclade-agent@1.2.3.
See all versions of aclade-agent for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of aclade-agent@1.2.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.