aethel-autapon@1.0.1
Compilador DAG para coordinación de agentes autónomos en Monad
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package main entrypoint makes repeated payments to a fixed address using locally loaded mandate credentials, without a per-payment runtime request. This is concrete unauthorized account activity and supports blocking publication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package manifest selects dag-compiler.mjs as its main entrypoint.
- The entrypoint reads mandatos-agentes.json and initializes the SDK with each mandate's private key.
- At top level, it creates three 0.05 payments per agent to the fixed address 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001.
- The payment call passes the loaded passkey and generated amount and recipient to the SDK.
- The entrypoint proceeds from validation to payment execution without requiring a runtime request.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedThe package manifest selects dag-compiler.mjs as its main entrypoint.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L1The entrypoint reads mandatos-agentes.json and initializes the SDK with each mandate's private key.
dag-compiler.mjsView on unpkg · L42Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aethel-autapon@1.0.1.
See all versions of aethel-autapon for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing aethel-autapon@1.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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